Oil and Gas in Sudan: Current Status, Challenges and Future Outlook

Executive Summary

Sudan's oil and gas sector stands at a critical crossroads, shaped by the profound consequences of South Sudan's secession in 2011 and the aggravating effects of persistent internal conflicts. Historically vital to the Sudanese economy, the sector has seen its reserves and production shrink considerably, turning Sudan from a major producer into an essential transit country.

Currently, proven crude oil reserves for Sudan and South Sudan combined stand at approximately 5 billion barrels, while natural gas reserves are estimated at 3 trillion cubic feet, although gas is neither produced nor consumed. Sudan's oil production declined slightly, standing at around 200,471 barrels per day in December 2023. The country's oil infrastructure, although robust in terms of nameplate capacity, suffers from massive underutilization and from vulnerabilities heightened by conflict, as shown by recent pipeline disruptions and damage to refineries.

The challenges are multiple and interconnected: chronic underinvestment, endemic governance problems, costly energy subsidies, and the devastating impact of political instability and armed conflict on operations and revenues. These factors have not only hampered economic growth but have also had serious social and environmental implications, including forced displacement of populations and increased pollution.

Despite these obstacles, opportunities are emerging. The partial resumption of South Sudan's oil exports through Sudanese pipelines offers a prospect of stabilizing transit revenues. At the same time, Sudan has considerable renewable energy potential, notably solar and wind, which is attracting the interest of international investors and partners and points to a possible path toward energy diversification and greater economic resilience. Realizing these prospects will depend crucially on establishing lasting political stability and transparent governance.

Introduction

Sudan's Geopolitical and Economic Context

Since its independence in 1956, Sudan has been the scene of two major civil wars, the second of which ended in 2005 with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). That agreement laid the groundwork for a referendum on independence for the South, which led to the creation of South Sudan in July 2011. This event profoundly altered Sudan's energy and economic landscape.  

The country currently faces acute macroeconomic challenges, exacerbated by internal conflicts. The economy is marked by high inflation and large budget deficits. The ongoing conflict in Sudan has, for example, severely disrupted trade routes and led to an influx of more than one million refugees and returnees into South Sudan, illustrating the scale of the regional humanitarian and economic crisis. This political and economic turbulence has a direct and significant impact on the viability and development of its energy sector.  

Strategic Importance of the Oil and Gas Sector

Historically, the oil sector has played a central, though often controversial, role in Sudan's politics and economy, shaping its development trajectory. Before South Sudan's secession, Sudan was a major oil exporter in Africa. The loss of most of its oil reserves transformed its role, with the country becoming primarily a transit corridor for South Sudanese oil. Despite this transformation, the sector remains of paramount importance for government revenues, notably through transit fees, and for domestic energy security, although national production no longer meets demand. The stability of the oil sector is therefore intrinsically linked to Sudan's ability to manage its relations with South Sudan and to stabilize its own internal situation.  

Reserves and Production: A Sector in Transition

History and Impact of South Sudan's Secession (2011)

South Sudan's secession in July 2011 was the most decisive event, fundamentally reshaping Sudan's energy landscape. The most immediate and drastic consequence was Sudan's loss of 75% of its oil reserves to the newly independent nation. This split led to a substantial reduction in Sudan's crude oil production capacity.  

It is essential to understand the intrinsic geographic and operational link between the oil sectors of the two countries. Most oil production assets are located near their common border or straddle it. This configuration has created a lasting paradox: South Sudan, although rich in oil, is landlocked and entirely dependent on Sudan's northern infrastructure to export its crude to world markets. This mutual dependence has established a symbiotic but inherently unstable relationship. Sudan relies on transit fees for its revenues , while South Sudan depends on Sudanese pipelines for its economic survival. This interdependence creates a shared regional vulnerability, constantly tested by the political instability and internal conflicts affecting both nations. The stability of Sudan's oil sector, and by extension of its economy, is thus inextricably linked to the political and security situation in South Sudan, and vice versa.  

Current State of Oil and Gas Reserves and Production (2023-2024)

Crude Oil

At the start of 2024, Sudan and South Sudan collectively held proven crude oil reserves estimated at 5 billion barrels, a figure unchanged from the previous year. This stability in the collective reserve figures suggests an absence of significant discoveries or major reassessments in recent years, which points to stagnating exploration and development efforts.  

Sudan's crude oil production stood at 200,471 barrels per day (b/d) in December 2023, a slight decrease from the 206,052 b/d recorded in December 2022. To put this in historical context, production from Sudanese oil fields was 59,000 b/d in 2021 , and had fallen from around 130,000 b/d in 2013 to 72,000 b/d in 2019. Sudan's fluctuating and generally declining production figures underscore the persistent challenges of underinvestment and political instability, which prevent the country from maximizing its remaining production potential. The stagnation of reserve figures, combined with low and fluctuating production, indicates a dormant or underdeveloped upstream sector. This low production, despite existing reserves, is directly attributable to insufficient investment in enhanced recovery techniques and to the pervasive impact of conflict and governance problems. The sector is characterized more by stagnation than by growth, and its long-term viability is uncertain without substantial new discoveries or a stable and attractive investment environment to develop existing resources more effectively.  

Natural Gas

Sudan and South Sudan collectively held proven natural gas reserves estimated at 3 trillion cubic feet at the start of 2024, a figure also unchanged from the previous year. Despite these reserves, neither Sudan nor South Sudan currently produces or consumes natural gas.  

The existence of significant natural gas reserves with no current production represents a major untapped resource. This situation highlights a critical gap in infrastructure development and investment for gas exploitation. It suggests a missed opportunity for energy diversification and domestic consumption, especially as Sudan faces a severe energy deficit. Developing these gas reserves could offer a viable path to reducing dependence on oil imports, improving national energy security and potentially generating new sources of revenue, offering a potentially more stable future than the declining oil sector.  

Table 1: Oil and Gas Reserves and Production in Sudan (2023-2024)

Indicator	Unit	Value (2024)	Value (2023)	Value (2022)
Crude Oil Reserves (proven)	Billion barrels	5 (collective SDN/SSD)	5 (collective SDN/SSD)	N/A
Natural Gas Reserves (proven)	Trillion cubic feet	3 (collective SDN/SSD)	3 (collective SDN/SSD)	N/A
Crude Oil Production (Sudan)	Mb/d	N/A	200.471	206.052
Natural Gas Production (Sudan)	N/A	0	0	0

Characteristics of Sudanese Crudes and Key Production Areas

Sudan and South Sudan produce three main crude oil blends: Dar, Nile and Fula. Dar Blend is a heavy, low-sulfur crude with a high total acid number (TAN) and corrosive qualities that can make refining difficult. It is produced in Blocks 3 and 7 of the Melut Basin, under South Sudan's control. Nile Blend is a medium, waxy crude produced in the Muglad Basin (Blocks 1, 2A, 2B, 4 and 5A); its characteristics make it more attractive to refiners because of its high yields of fuel and gasoil. Fula Blend, a highly acidic crude produced in the Muglad Basin (Block 6), is processed for domestic consumption.  

The specific characteristics of these crudes, in particular the corrosive nature of Dar Blend, pose inherent technical challenges for refining and, more importantly, for pipeline maintenance. This property adds to operational complexity and potential costs, especially in a region already suffering from chronic underinvestment and conflict-related infrastructure damage. The congealing incident on the Petrodar pipeline, which led to a rupture in February 2024 because of a shortage of diesel fuel for heating, could be aggravated by such characteristics. The technical properties of the crude itself exacerbate the maintenance and operating challenges of the shared pipeline infrastructure, potentially leading to more frequent disruptions and higher maintenance costs, which heightens the sector's fragility.  

Oil and Gas Infrastructure: Capacities and Vulnerabilities

Detailed Description of the Pipeline Network and Export Terminals

Sudan is endowed with a "robust oil infrastructure" , although its current operating condition is heavily affected by conflict and underinvestment.  

The pipeline network is extensive:

• The Blocks 1, 2 and 4 pipeline runs 1,510 km with a diameter of 28 inches, comprising 6 pumping stations and a daily capacity of 500,000 barrels. It is connected to a marine terminal able to store 1.8 million barrels.
• The Blocks 3 and 7 pipeline, the Petrodar pipeline, is an essential conduit for transporting South Sudan's Dar Blend. It is 1,472 km long with a diameter of 32 inches, also has 6 pumping stations and can carry up to 750,000 barrels per day. It is connected to a marine terminal with a storage capacity of 3 million barrels.
• The Block 6 pipeline, 716 km long with a diameter of 24 inches, is equipped with 6 pumping stations and has a maximum capacity of 250,000 barrels per day, carrying oil to the Khartoum refinery.
• In total, Sudan's pipeline network extends 3,700 km, with a combined capacity of 1.5 million barrels of oil per day, and a total marine terminal storage capacity of 4.8 million barrels.

Crude oil exports are made mainly from Port Sudan to Asian markets via the strategically important Bab el-Mandeb strait. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have retained control of the Port Sudan export terminal on the Red Sea.  

The central processing facilities (CPFs) include Heglig CPF (processing capacity of 350,000 b/d), Jabalyn CPF (300,000 b/d) and Fula CPF (200,000 b/d). The total processing capacity of these facilities is 850,000 barrels per day.  

The nameplate capacity of Sudan's pipeline and processing infrastructure is considerably higher than both Sudan's current domestic production and South Sudan's export volumes. This striking disparity highlights a massive underutilization of existing assets. It means that if stability returned and investment materialized, there would be sufficient existing infrastructure to support a substantial increase in throughput, particularly for South Sudanese oil, without requiring major new construction. This latent capacity represents a significant potential asset for future regional energy trade and economic recovery. However, realizing this potential depends on stabilizing the political and security environment, as well as carrying out the maintenance and upgrades needed to restore the integrity of the facilities.  

Refinery and Central Processing Facility Capacities

Sudan's domestic refining capacity amounts to 110,000 barrels of oil per day (BOPD), split between the Khartoum refinery (95,000 BOPD, with upgrade plans), the Obeid refinery (15,000 BOPD) and the Port Sudan refinery (slated for rehabilitation).  

The Al-Jaili, or Khartoum, refinery has a processing capacity of 100,000 barrels of crude oil per day and was previously responsible for supplying 60% of the country's gasoline. A smaller refinery, the El Obeid refinery, has a capacity of 15,000 b/d and was looted in July 2023.  

Sudan's total refining capacity (110,000 BOPD) is greater than its current crude oil production (around 200,471 b/d in December 2023, although part of that is destined for export or is Sudan's share of South Sudanese oil). This situation, combined with refinery disruptions, leads to a growing dependence on fuel imports, with 50% of gasoline, more than 60% of diesel and 50% of LPG having to be imported in 2019. Despite the theoretical capacity, domestic refineries cannot operate at full capacity because of reduced crude oil production and conflict-related damage. This creates a critical bottleneck in Sudan's energy supply chain, leaving the country vulnerable to global price shocks and supply disruptions.  

Impact of Conflict and Underinvestment on Infrastructure

The civil conflicts that have marked Sudan since 1956 have had profound repercussions on its oil sector. South Sudan's secession in 2011 not only reduced reserves but also led to stagnating growth in oil production in both countries because of insufficient upstream investment and persistent political instability.  

The ongoing conflict in Sudan, which broke out in April 2023, has had a particularly severe impact on South Sudan's oil industry, since the only export pipelines cross Sudan to the Red Sea. Within a few months, fighting damaged and interrupted the pipeline system, forcing a halt to South Sudan's oil exports in early 2024. The Sudanese authorities declared force majeure on oil transit in March 2024 because of the deteriorating security conditions along the pipeline corridor. Oil flows were drastically reduced from mid-February 2024, cutting South Sudan's exports to about one third of their normal level. The Petrodar pipeline, vital for South Sudan's exports, suffered a rupture in February 2024, as the oil congealed because of a shortage of the diesel fuel needed for heating.  

The Al-Jaili or Khartoum refinery has been the target of several attacks since April 2023, which has considerably reduced its output levels. These repeated incidents, including large fires, have caused substantial damage to the infrastructure, leading to fuel shortages and disruptions to the energy supply. Damage to the facilities and storage installations has also caused contamination in and around the site, while major fires have degraded air quality by releasing hazardous gases and pollutants.  

Sudan's oil sector suffers from many years of underinvestment. The government, facing a lack of financial resources, is often unable to pay contractors or to purchase new equipment to modernize physical facilities and improve staff capacity. This inability to invest in maintenance and upgrades leaves the existing infrastructure extremely vulnerable to shocks. South Sudan's dependence on a single export pipeline crossing an active conflict zone illustrates a critical systemic vulnerability. The oil infrastructure, although robust on paper, has become a major point of failure for both economies, making them excessively sensitive to even minor security or operational disruptions.  

Economic Contribution and Operating Framework

Contribution to GDP and Export Revenues

The oil sector has historically been a pillar of the Sudanese economy, although its role has changed significantly since South Sudan's secession. In 2021, oil revenues accounted for 3.30% of Sudan's GDP, up from 1.88% in 2020. Historically, Sudan's average from 1971 to 2021 is 3.17%, with a peak of 17.89% in 2008, before the secession.  

South Sudan's dependence on oil is even more pronounced, with oil accounting for more than 60% of its GDP, 99% of its exports and 90% of government revenues. The shutdown of the Dar Blend oil export pipeline in February 2024, which carried 60% of South Sudan's oil across war-torn Sudan, led to a collapse in domestic oil production. This interruption caused production to fall from nearly 160,000 barrels per day (b/d) before the shutdown to an average of 60,000 b/d the following year, resulting in a 7.2% decline in South Sudan's GDP for fiscal year 2024. South Sudan lost around $7 million in revenue per day because of the halt in oil exports, and the government lost about 70% of its oil revenues.  

This loss precipitated a fiscal implosion for South Sudan, leading to a currency crisis and hyperinflation. The exchange rate of the South Sudanese pound (SSP) went from around 1,100 SSP per US dollar in early 2024 to around 1,550 SSP per dollar in mid-2024, a depreciation of about 40%. Sudan itself, already in economic free fall because of its own war, suffered an additional blow from the loss of South Sudanese oil transit fees, exacerbating fuel shortages and revenue deficits.  

Overreliance on oil and the vulnerability of transit infrastructure create a chronic fiscal vulnerability for both countries. Government revenues are directly tied to the stability of oil flows, making national budgets extremely sensitive to production shocks and pipeline disruptions. This situation prevents stable fiscal planning and hampers governments' ability to provide essential public services, creating a vicious circle of economic and social instability.

Main Operating Companies

Sudan's oil and gas sector is dominated by a mix of state entities and foreign companies, mainly Asian. The main companies operating in Sudan include the Sudan National Petroleum Corporation, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), Petrodar Operating Company, Sunagas and Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC).  

The Sudan National Petroleum Corporation is a state entity that manages national oil resources and infrastructure, overseeing the exploration and development of Sudanese oil resources. CNPC is a key player in exploration and production, with a focus on strategic partnerships and extensive upstream operations, including pipeline development. Petrodar Operating Company is a joint venture primarily engaged in onshore oil production in the region. Sunagas operates in the gas sector, with an emphasis on developing infrastructure for natural gas supply. ONGC is an international entity involved in oil and gas exploration and production joint ventures. Other notable companies include JSC Zarubezhneft, PETRONAS Gas Berhad, Petro Energy E&P and Khartoum Refinery Co., Ltd..  

Historically, Sudan's oil sector has seen significant changes in foreign participation. The American oil giant Chevron was the first foreign company to invest in Sudan's oil sector, starting in 1974, but suspended its operations in 1984 because of the second civil war and was forced to withdraw in 1992 following growing political uncertainty and pressure from the US government. The deteriorating relations between Khartoum and Washington, in particular US sanctions, deterred other major oil companies from investing in Sudan. This vacuum was filled by Asian companies, including CNPC, Malaysia's state-owned Petronas and India's ONGC, which have dominated the Sudanese oil market since 1995.  

This reliance on Asian companies, while it enabled the sector's initial development, has created a concentration of risk and a vulnerability to the geopolitical dynamics specific to these relationships. The lack of a more diversified investor portfolio limits Sudan's options for financing and technical expertise, especially when market conditions or the domestic policies of these companies' home countries change.

Regulatory Framework and Governance

Sudan's oil sector is characterized by complex governance problems and opaque financial flows. Even after the lifting of US economic sanctions in 2017, the lack of interest from new foreign investors in the 15 blocks offered by the authorities reflects not only low expectations of major new discoveries, but also significant weaknesses in governance and policy. Without foreign investment, the Government of Sudan has been unable to develop this sector because of resource constraints and the absence of a clear development strategy.  

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) such as the Sudan National Petroleum Corporation (Sudapet) and Khartoum Refinery Co. Ltd (KRC) dominate the oil sector but do not operate on a commercial basis. Sudapet is reported to be inactive in oil exploration, merely managing government revenues from profit-sharing agreements. The Sudanese Petroleum Corporation (SPC), formerly responsible for importing and distributing fuels, was dissolved in March 2019 for unpublished reasons, with its assets and employees transferred to the Ministry of Energy and Mining (MOEM). The MOEM is deeply involved in the oil sector, regulating the sector and managing the financial operations of SOEs, which creates a potential conflict of interest and makes the SOEs' financial situation opaque to the public.  

A major challenge is energy subsidy policy. Domestic fuel prices in Sudan are among the lowest in the world, administered by the government and well below production/import costs. For example, gasoline is priced at USD 0.14 per liter and diesel at USD 0.09 per liter. These growing subsidies have drained government resources and triggered a vicious circle of inflation and exchange rate depreciation. They have forced the Central Bank to engage in various quasi-fiscal operations to acquire foreign currency to support the import of strategic goods, including fuel, thereby undermining its independence and leading to very rapid growth in the money supply, high inflation and currency depreciation. In addition, the total amount of energy subsidies is not transparent and is only partially reflected in the government's balance sheet, with a large share recorded on the Central Bank's balance sheet because of multiple exchange rates. Subsidies are estimated to benefit mainly high-income households and neighboring countries because of smuggling.  

This "subsidy trap" diverts vital resources that could be used for investment in the sector or in other development areas. The opacity and distortions created by these policies discourage private investment and hamper the sector's ability to operate sustainably and efficiently.

Despite these challenges, the Ministry of Minerals offers incentives to potential investors in the extractive sector, such as recovery of capitalized exploration and development expenses, duty-free import of all mining equipment, majority ownership and favorable exchange rates. However, the effectiveness of these incentives is undermined by the overall governance framework and instability.  

Social and Environmental Implications

Forced Displacement and Human Rights

Large-scale oil exploitation in Sudan has been inextricably linked to the intensification of civil conflict and to serious human rights violations. Oil became a primary objective and a major cause of the war, with oil revenues used by the government to acquire weapons and ammunition, thereby intensifying the conflict.  

The forced displacement of the civilian population is the central human rights issue linked to oil development in Sudan. The government is directly responsible for this displacement, carried out to secure the operations of its partners, the international and mostly foreign oil companies. The longtime residents of the oil fields, the Nuer and Dinka peoples, were perceived as a security threat, and campaigns of killing, looting and burning, backed by government troops and air support, cleared the ground for the development of oil infrastructure. It is estimated that in March 2002, 174,200 civilians remained displaced because of the conflict in the oil fields of Western Upper Nile/Unity State.  

International oil companies operating in Sudan have often denied that abuses were occurring in connection with oil exploration and production, claiming to be unaware of any uncompensated forced displacement despite considerable evidence to the contrary. This situation highlights a "resource curse," in which oil wealth, instead of benefiting the population, fuels conflict, corruption and human rights violations. The cycle of financing the war with oil, which then makes it possible to secure more oil areas, creates an environment in which local populations are the main victims of the exploitation of natural resources.  

Environmental Impacts of Conflict

The conflict in Sudan has also had significant environmental impacts, including increased deforestation, agricultural decline and pollution resulting from damage to industrial and energy infrastructure. Hazardous industrial and energy facilities, including oil refineries, industrial and chemical plants and power stations, have been affected by physical damage and power outages, posing substantial environmental risks.  

The Al-Jaili or Khartoum refinery, located 45 km north of Khartoum, has suffered recurring and highly damaging incidents. Repeated periods of fighting and occupation at this strategically important site have led to multiple major fires and extensive damage to its infrastructure. Damage to the refinery and its storage facilities has caused contamination in and around the site, while large oil fires have degraded air quality by releasing hazardous gases and pollutants. A massive fire on January 23, 2025 produced a smoke plume stretching more than 300 km, darkening the skies over downwind communities.  

The proximity of hazardous industrial sites to residential neighborhoods in Khartoum increases the risk of local populations being exposed to pollutants when these sites are damaged. These environmental impacts are aggravated by the conflict, creating long-term health and ecological risks that complicate post-conflict recovery. The destruction of energy and industrial infrastructure not only disrupts energy supply but also releases toxic substances into the environment, creating immediate health risks and long-term rehabilitation challenges.  

Future Outlook and Diversification Potential

Outlook for the Oil and Gas Sector

Sudan's oil and gas sector is at a pivotal moment, with short-term prospects tied to the resumption of South Sudan's exports and long-term structural challenges. The repair of the Petrodar pipeline and the resumption of South Sudan's oil exports, expected for late March or early April 2025, should support an economic recovery in South Sudan and, by extension, stabilize transit revenues for Sudan. The South Sudanese government aims to increase its production to 90,000 barrels per day in the first half of 2025.  

However, this recovery remains fragile. South Sudan's dependence on pipelines crossing Sudan, where fighting and fuel shortages persist, continues to threaten oil exports. The force majeure on oil transit, lifted in January 2025, is expected to take time before exports fully resume via the restored DPOC pipeline from Port Sudan.  

In the long term, significant challenges remain. Existing oil fields are depleting, and chronic underinvestment, combined with the lack of major new discoveries, limits growth potential. Plans to build alternative pipelines to the ports of Lamu (Kenya) or Djibouti (via Ethiopia) remain distant aspirations, facing considerable financial and logistical challenges. The recovery of the oil sector is therefore conditional on lasting political stability and significant investment, without which dependence on vulnerable infrastructure will persist, making any recovery precarious.  

Exploration Potential and New Discoveries

Despite the theoretical potential to increase production through primary recovery techniques, Sudan's oil sector has failed to attract significant new foreign investors, even after the lifting of US sanctions in 2017. The lack of investor interest, combined with the absence of any major new oil or gas discoveries mentioned in recent data for Sudan, highlights missed opportunities.  

Proven natural gas reserves, estimated at 3 trillion cubic feet , represent a major untapped resource. The absence of natural gas production or consumption underscores a critical gap in investment and in the development of gas infrastructure. This situation indicates an inability to capitalize on resources that could diversify the country's energy supply and reduce its dependence on oil imports. Developing these gas reserves could offer a path toward greater energy security and new sources of revenue, but it will require substantial investment and a stable political environment.  

Government Policies and Attracting Investment

The Sudanese government has expressed its intention to attract investment to revitalize the energy sector, particularly since April 2023, in the face of a severe energy deficit exacerbated by civil conflict. Efforts are under way to secure fuel supply and improve energy infrastructure. Sudan has expressed its openness to investment in oil and gas, as well as in power generation, including clean energy sources such as solar and wind. The amendment of the electricity investment law reflects the government's commitment to encouraging private sector participation.  

Strategic partnerships are being sought, as shown by Turkey's plans to invest significantly in Sudan's oil, gas, pipeline and electricity sectors. Turkey's ambassador stressed Ankara's desire to move from project-based cooperation to a more strategic partnership, leveraging Turkish experience in energy investments. Discussions are also under way on specific solar energy projects, with studies ready for five solar projects totaling 1,500 megawatts.  

The Ministry of Minerals offers incentives to potential investors in the extractive sector, including renewable exploration and exploitation licenses, recovery of capitalized expenses, duty-free import of all mining equipment, majority ownership and favorable exchange rates. However, despite these initiatives and incentives, chronic underinvestment and persistent political instability create a gap between stated policy and the reality of attracting capital. The effectiveness of these measures is limited as long as the risks related to security, opaque governance and the lack of government financial resources to support projects are not resolved.  

Renewable Energy Development

Sudan has abundant renewable energy resources, notably solar, wind and hydroelectric. The country enjoys one of the highest solar irradiation rates in the world, with a generation potential of up to 15 GW of solar power. In addition, wind potential is estimated at 1.5 GW.  

In recent years, Sudan has made progress in developing its renewable energy sector, with several large-scale projects being planned or implemented. The Sudanese government has announced plans to build a 100 MW solar power plant in Dongola and a 50 MW wind farm in Red Sea State. The government has also committed to reaching a total of 5 GW of renewable energy by 2030.  

The World Bank has announced a significant investment in renewable energy in Sudan with the launch of the ASCENT-Sudan project. This $76.3 million initiative aims to expand access to renewable energy and support vulnerable communities, focusing on the rehabilitation of the existing hydroelectric plant in the Kassala region and the installation of new solar and hydropower projects. The project is financed by the Sudan Transition and Recovery Support (STARS) Trust Fund and the Sudan Multi-Partner Fund (SMPF).  

Partnerships with the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) and the African Development Bank (AfDB) are also in place to support the development of renewable energy projects and encourage the adoption of clean energy technologies. Turkey's interest in Sudan's solar sector, with studies ready for solar projects totaling 1,500 MW, underscores the potential for foreign investment in this area.  

This strategic shift toward renewable energy represents a crucial path for Sudan's energy diversification. By harnessing its vast solar and wind resources, the country can reduce its dependence on costly and polluting fossil fuels, improve energy security, and create new economic opportunities. This development offers a more stable and sustainable outlook for Sudan's energy future, in contrast to the persistent challenges of the oil sector.

Conclusions

Sudan's oil and gas sector is a complex system whose current state is the result of a delicate interplay between rich geology, volatile political dynamics and difficult economic realities. South Sudan's secession in 2011 was a transformative event, considerably reducing Sudan's reserves and production and turning it into an essential transit country. This transformation created a critical interdependence with South Sudan, where the stability of oil flows is vital to both economies but remains constantly threatened by conflict.

The sector's challenges are deep: chronic underinvestment, opaque governance and costly energy subsidies that drain state resources. Political instability and armed conflict have had devastating consequences for infrastructure, as shown by damage to pipelines and refineries, leading to massive underutilization of existing capacity and fuel shortages. Beyond the economic impacts, oil exploitation has been associated with serious human rights violations, including forced displacement of populations, and with heightened environmental risks.

Despite this complex picture, prospects are emerging. The partial resumption of South Sudan's oil exports offers a glimmer of hope for stabilizing transit revenues. More fundamentally, Sudan has considerable renewable energy potential, particularly solar and wind, which is attracting the attention of international investors and development institutions. This potential offers a strategic path toward energy diversification, reduced dependence on fossil fuels and the building of a more resilient economy.

However, realizing these prospects will depend crucially on Sudan's ability to establish lasting political stability and to implement transparent governance reforms. Without a secure environment and reliable regulatory frameworks, the investment needed to revitalize the oil sector or develop renewable energy will remain limited. Sudan's energy future is intrinsically tied to its ability to overcome its internal divisions and create an environment conducive to sustainable and equitable development.Sources used in the report